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Distributional Implications of Tax Evasion in Greece 
 




The shadow economy and tax evasion are both widespread in Greece. 
This has adverse effects in terms of horizontal and vertical equity, as 
well as in terms of efficiency. We take advantage of access to a large 
sample of income tax returns in 2004/05, and compare tax reported 
incomes with those observed in the household budget survey of that 
year. We re-weight our two datasets to make them fully comparable, 
and carefully select the reference population. We then calculate 
ratios of income under-reporting by region and income source. The 
synthetic distribution of reported incomes is then fed into a tax-
benefit model to provide preliminary estimates of the size and 
distribution of income tax evasion in Greece. Income under-reporting 
is estimated at 10%, resulting in a 26% shortfall in tax receipts. The 
paper finds that the effects of tax evasion are higher income 
inequality and poverty, as well as lower progressivity of the income 
tax system. 
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Income tax evasion raises significant issues from the point of view of 
efficiency. Lower tax revenues may ultimately lead to higher tax burdens on 
those who do pay. Moreover, to the extent that opportunities to evade differ by 
occupation and/or sector of the economy (Frederiksen et al., 2005), tax evasion 
will also distort labour supply decisions – although it is not always easy to 
confirm this assumption empirically (Parker, 2003). 
On the other hand, tax evasion has profound implications for distributional 
analysis. In terms of vertical equity, “if the poor had more opportunity of 
evading taxes than the rich, or were better at it, then the egalitarian policy 
maker might have good reason to smile indulgently on evasion: up to a point 
anyway” (Cowell, 1987). However, tax evasion may soften rather than 
strengthen the redistributive impact intended by the tax schedule. Either way, 
ignoring tax evasion is likely to cause decision makers and policy analysts 
seriously to misjudge the distributive and fiscal effect of changes in social 
benefits and the tax system. 
In terms of horizontal equity, individuals with similar income differ in terms of 
inclination and opportunity to under-report it. As a result, tax evasion violates 
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notions of fairness and equal treatment, and undermines the idea of reciprocity 
which lies at the heart of the social contract between taxpayers and the state. 
This paper is concerned with the distributional implications of income tax 
evasion in Greece, where the informal economy is widely held to be very 
extensive. More specifically, it combines an estimation of non-compliance 
patterns in terms of income under-reporting, with an estimation of the 
distribution of gains from tax evasion in the general population using a tax-
benefit model. We compare two datasets, a random sample of unaudited tax 
returns filed in 2005 (incomes earned in 2004), and the 2004/05 Household 
Budget Survey. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section two offers a literature review. 
Section three explains the methodology and presents the data. Section four 
reports the results. Section five discusses the main findings. Section six 
concludes with a discussion of policy implications and issues for further 
research. 
 
2. Literature review 
Scholarly interest in tax evasion is growing fast, both in terms of theoretical 
treatment and empirical research. Comprehensive reviews of that literature are 
offered in Andreoni et al. (1998) and Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002), while 
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Slemrod (2007) provides a recent overview of what is known about the extent 
and the determinants of tax evasion. 
This paper draws selectively on that literature. In particular, the deterrence 
model of tax evasion, formulated by Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and 
Yitzhaki (1974), assumes that rational taxpayers decide how much to evade 
given their income, the marginal tax rate, as well as (crucially) the subjective 
probability of detection and the penalty rate. While the relation between the last 
two factors has been the focus of research on the optimal design of auditing 
policies, the starting point of our own research is the theoretical insight that the 
level of tax evasion is a negative function of the subjective probability of 
detection. 
Indeed, evidence on cross-sectional variation in non-compliance rates across 
income sources provides compelling empirical support for the deterrence 
model. Specifically, there seems to be a clear positive correlation between the 
rate of compliance and the probability of detection in the presence of 
enforcement mechanisms. As Sandmo (2005) noted, since wages and salaries 
are typically reported to tax authorities by employers, under-reporting by 
employees would lead to certain detection. 
In fact, the analysis of US tax audit data collected under the Taxpayer 
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) in 1988 demonstrated that the rate 
of under-reporting of income from dependent employment (0.5%) was much 
lower than for self-employment income (58.6%) (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002). 
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Similar data from the successor to TCMP, the National Research Program 
(NCP), showed that an estimated 57% of self-employment income was under-
reported, compared to 1% of wages and salaries (Slemrod, 2007). 
These findings are supported by evidence on patterns of non-compliance by 
income source from other countries, or using different research designs (or 
both). For example, Pissarides and Weber (1989) found that the self-employed 
in Britain spent a higher share of their reported income on food (other things 
such as household characteristics being equal), and attributed this to income 
under-reporting rather than a higher propensity to consume food – a finding 
later replicated by Lyssiotou et al. (2004). Feldman and Slemrod (2007) used 
this insight to analyse the relationship between charitable contributions and 
reported income, and argued that the higher contributions of the self-employed 
at similar levels of reported incomes could only be explained by higher income 
under-reporting. In Italy, Fiorio and D’Amuri (2005) estimated the rate of 
under-reporting of self-employment income around the median of the 
distribution at 27.7%, compared to 1.9% for income from wages and salaries. 
In Hungary, Krekó and Kiss (2007) highlighted the opportunities for (legal) tax 
avoidance and (illegal) tax evasion available to the self-employed. In Greece, 
Tatsos (2001) found that the self-employed were more likely to participate in 
unregistered activities that remain invisible to the tax authorities.  
Note that what the theory predicts is that the propensity to evade taxes will vary 
by income source, not by employment status. The distinction is clear in the case 
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of employees “moonlighting” (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002). Since the 
probability of detection is lower for self-employment income earned in their 
spare time than it is for wages or salaries from their main job, the expected rate 
of under-reporting will be higher for the former than for the latter. 
While the evidence on patterns of non-compliance by income source seems 
robust, and is supported by unambiguous theoretical predictions, the same 
cannot be said with respect to non-compliance by income class. Even though 
theoretical models generate no clear prediction on the relative strength of 
income and substitution effects of tax rates on compliance, they all indicate that 
tax evasion should generally rise with income (Andreoni et al., 1998). 
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence is mixed. 
For example, Christian (1994) used data from the 1988 TCMP study to show 
that, relative to the size of their true income, higher-income taxpayers evaded 
less than those on lower incomes. However, his study was seen as inconclusive 
on methodological grounds: it classified as low incomes taxpayers with high 
permanent income reporting business losses, while it failed to account for 
illegal tax shelters and for non-compliance in partnership and corporate tax 
returns (Slemrod, 2007). Fiorio and D’Amuri (2005) also found that the share 
of unreported income in Italy fell with income. In contrast, Pashardes and 
Polycarpou (2008) showed that, once corrected for tax evasion, the income 
distribution in Cyprus was less equal than the distribution of reported incomes, 
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while Tatsos (2001) argued that high earners in Greece were more inclined to 
non-compliance. 
On the whole, little is known about the level of non-compliance by income 
class, and the available evidence does not always support the hypothesis of a 
regressive bias of tax evasion. 
The trouble with the deterrence model is that it seems to predict more tax 
evasion than is actually observed. While several studies within this intellectual 
tradition (Sandmo, 1981; Andreoni et al., 1998; Pestieau et al., 2004; Sandmo, 
2005; Slemrod, 2007) attempted to resolve this puzzle, others have looked for 
explanations elsewhere. The emphasis on intrinsic motivations, such as civic 
virtue, is the main contribution of behavioural theories to the understanding of 
tax evasion. Frey (1997), for instance, argued that there is more to tax 
compliance than simple fear of punishment, and that excessive reliance on 
extrinsic motivations (such as increased penalties) may ultimately crowd out 
intrinsic ones. 
One implication of the theory, the proposition that the propensity to evade taxes 
will inversely correlate with trust in institutions, appears to have intuitive 
appeal and has in fact found support in the literature. Some have attempted to 
test behavioural models drawing on the results of the World Values Survey 
(WVS), the European Values Survey (EVS) or similar surveys. For example, 
Torgler (2003) and Slemrod (2003) established that professed trust in 
government correlates quite closely with survey-based attitudes towards tax 
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evasion, both across countries and across individuals within countries. 
Furthermore, Hanousek and Palda (2004) analysed opinion poll evidence from 
the Czech Republic relating attitudes towards tax evasion to perceived quality 
of public services, and found that a 20% increase in the former could lead to a 
13% reduction in the latter. Still, as Slemrod (2007) has pointed out, “survey 
responses may also reflect after-the-fact rationalization of noncompliant 
behaviour”. 
Empirical approaches to estimating the size of informal activities and/or tax 
evasion often rely on relationships between macroeconomic indicators. The 
most common are the demand-for-currency method (Cagan, 1958; Tanzi, 1983; 
Bhattacharyya, 1990), the transactions method (Feige, 1979), the electricity 
consumption method (Lackò, 2000), and the Multiple Indicators Multiple 
Causes (MIMIC) method (Frey and Weck-Hannemann, 1984; Schneider, 1997; 
Giles 1997; Dell’Anno et al., 2007). These methods, reviewed by Schneider 
and Ernste (2000) and Schneider and Klinglmair (2004), have been extensively 
criticized on the grounds that their estimates are sensitive to changes in key 
parameters and are not firmly based on theory (Thomas, 1999; Caridi and 
Passerini, 2001; Breusch, 2006; Hanousek and Palda, 2006). 
Another strand of research using microeconomic data relies on the expenditure-
based method (Pissarides and Weber, 1989; Lyssiotou et al., 2004, Feldman 
and Slemrod, 2007). The method assumes that family expenditure surveys are 
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more reliable on the expenditure side rather than on the income side, and use 
information on the former to estimate under-reporting of the latter. 
Direct methods include voluntary questionnaire-based sample surveys, trying to 
elicit information on respondents’ non-compliance (Mogensen et al., 1995; 
Pedersen, 2003), and the discrepancy method. The latter focuses on the 
difference between two alternative and independent measurements of the same 
variable, e.g. comparing income declared for tax purposes to that measured by 
selective checks such as audits. Most of the TCMP/NCP studies in the US 
belong to that category. The analysis of tax returns alongside a general-purpose 
income survey may be thought of as an extension of the discrepancy method. 
(Note that the term “discrepancy method” is also used to describe macro 
studies looking at the difference between expenditure and income statistics in 
national accounts, between the official and the actual labour force etc.) 
Studies attempting to estimate the size of the informal economy and tax 
evasion in Greece (Pavlopoulos, 1987; Vavouras et al., 1990; Negreponti, 
1991; Kanellopoulos et al., 1995; Tatsos, 2001), sometimes in a comparative 
context (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004; Lackò, 
2000; Dell’Anno et al., 2007), have all used macro data. Some of the resulting 
estimates put the size of the informal economy at as much as 37% of GDP, 
though mostly at about 30%, and the size of tax evasion at 15% of GDP. 
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3. Methodology and data 
This paper departs from previous studies of tax evasion in Greece in that it uses 
micro data. In particular, it builds on the discrepancy method applied in Fiorio 
and D’Amuri (2005), albeit with important differences. 
We begin with the similarities. Both papers compare data from an income 
survey to a sample of tax returns. Both papers assume that taxpayers concealing 
part of their income from tax authorities might consider declaring a higher 
figure to an anonymous interviewer. 
Nevertheless, our approaches differ in significant ways. Fiorio and D’Amuri 
(2005) had no direct access to their sample of tax data, analysed on their behalf 
by the Ministry of Finance. In order to correct for non-response bias in the 
income survey, and hence ensure that the two datasets are representative of the 
Italian population, they apply a post-stratification procedure. Thereafter, 
income by source is ranked by centile, and all (positive) differences between 
observed income in the survey and reported income in the sample of tax returns 
are attributed to non-compliance for the purpose of tax evasion. As Mantovani 
and Nienadowska (2007) have shown, that approach implicitly amounts to 
assuming away re-ranking effects, which in turn leads to an under-estimation of 
the regressive impact of tax evasion. 
In contrast, we had full access to a random sample of unaudited income tax 
returns (at a sampling fraction of approximately 0.53%), supplied by the 
Ministry of Finance to our institution in anonymised form. We make an effort 
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to define the reference population in such a way as to minimise measurement 
and simulation errors, in particular the unreliability of income surveys at the 
bottom of the income distribution, and the impossibility to model tax rules in 
all their complexity (e.g. with respect to presumptive taxation, or the treatment 
of luxury goods as proxies for high income). We then compare across the two 
datasets by category, as defined by income source and region, rather than by 
income level (centile), and from that comparison we derive adjustment rates in 
order to correct for tax evasion. We focus on income source rather than 
employment status to allow for individuals earning income from multiple 
sources (“moonlighting”). We explicitly assume that all income from a certain 
source earned by residents of a certain region is under-reported at the same 
rate, regardless of its level. While this is a strong assumption, it seems to us 
preferable to alternatives in the light of theoretical ambiguity and 
methodological complications arising from re-ranking effects. We do present 
estimates of under-reporting by level of income, but these are due to a pure 
composition effect, i.e. result from our application of adjustment rates by 
income source and region to the entire income distribution. 
The main contribution of our paper to the literature, beyond the above 
refinements, is that it links an estimation of non-compliance patterns to an 
analysis of how gains from tax evasion are distributed in the general 
population. 
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Our estimates refer to the year 2004. Personal income tax is individual. 
Spouses file a joint income tax return, but their income is separately recorded 
and individually taxed – except for some tax allowances and/or tax credits, 
which are jointly assessed. The tax unit for the assessment of tax allowances or 
credits includes spouse and dependent child(ren). The tax schedule is shown in 
Table 1. 
Table 1. Income tax brackets and marginal tax rates (2004). 
income brackets (€ p.a.) 
From to 
tax rate 
0 8,400 0% 
8,400 13,400 15% 
13,400 23,400 30% 
23,400  40% 
Notes: The zero-tax threshold was set at €10,000 for employees or pensioners, and was raised for 
taxpayers with dependent children (by €1,000 for one child, by €2,000 for two children, by €10,000 for 
three children, and by an extra €1,000 for each subsequent child). 
In a bid to combat tax evasion, the system provides for presumptive taxation. 
More specifically, a rather detailed set of rules applies to a number of activities 
(e.g. shopkeeping, personal private services, and all other types of self-
employment, including the medical and other professions), specifying a 
minimum taxable income which varies by type of activity, seniority, location 
etc. If a taxpayer declares a level of earnings below the minimum taxable 
income, tax due is assessed at the minimum. Also, luxury assets such as 
swimming pools, helicopters, yachting boats and the like may lead to an 
upwards revision of taxable income by the tax authorities. Even though 
presumptive taxation may correct some tax evasion at the margin, the 
correction and corresponding recovery of tax receipts is more effective at lower 
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rather than higher levels of income. Presumptive taxation rules are impossible 
to simulate because the detailed information they rest on is largely unavailable. 
Our estimation of the size and incidence of tax evasion draws on two sets of 
data: (a) the microdata from a household budget survey, and (b) a large sample 
of unaudited income tax returns randomly drawn for the purposes of this study. 
The 2004/05 Household Budget Survey was carried out by the National 
Statistical Service of Greece over the 12-month period starting February 2004 
and ending January 2005. The survey contains detailed information on the 
personal incomes, expenditure patterns and demographic characteristics of 
17,386 individuals in 6,555 households. All household members aged over 14 
were interviewed separately. 
The sample of unaudited tax returns contains information on the demographic 
and other characteristics of tax units, as well as on incomes earned in 2004 
(reported in tax year 2005). Our sample covers 41,283 taxpayers and 12,203 
children and other dependents in 27,414 tax units (0.53% of all tax returns). 
We compare the distribution of income as observed in the survey with a 
synthetic distribution of reported income as revealed to tax authorities, which 
we have corrected for income under-reporting in the light of information 
derived from the sample of tax returns. 
A crucial assumption is that respondents reveal their income to survey 
interviewers more truthfully than they do when filling their tax return. While 
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this assumption has intuitive appeal, and is consistent with incentives, all 
income is known to be measured with error. Atkinson et al. (1995) 
conceptually defined five levels of measuring income (“true income”, 
administrative record income, tax reported income, edited survey income, 
reported survey income), with involuntary measurement error potentially 
increasing as we move from one level to the next. Dhami and Al-Nowaihi 
(2006) discussed measurement error in the context of tax evasion. Rendtel et al. 
(2004) carefully analysed factors leading to misreporting of incomes in 
surveys. Respondents tend to forget small or irregular incomes such as tips and 
bonuses, and to estimate uncertain incomes (e.g. from self employment) 
conservatively – to which one might add recall error, possibly rising with age. 
Over-reporting of incomes in surveys relative to tax registers can also happen: 
respondents may confuse net and gross earnings, or ignore tax deductions, 
while self-employed workers will report positive incomes in the survey (or 
negative incomes will be edited out of the survey) even when for tax purposes 
they report negative incomes. Moreover, taxable incomes may be under-
reported relative to survey incomes for the purpose of tax evasion, i.e. 
voluntarily. Jäntti (2004) found that interview incomes tend on average to be 
lower than register incomes, while non-respondents tend to have lower incomes 
than respondents. On the whole, Rendtel et al. (2004) concluded that “all trends 
will be present to some extent and it is not clear how these trends balance at the 
end”. 
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In this paper, we accept that involuntary measurement error can go either way, 
but rely on the working hypothesis that the various causal factors offset each 
other, and that residual discrepancies between survey incomes and tax reported 
incomes can be attributed to tax evasion alone. Furthermore, we attempt to 
minimise measurement (and simulation) error by defining the reference 
population narrowly. This is explained below. 
We begin by adjusting income components in the survey in such a way as to 
mirror income as reported to the tax authorities. Here, the main objectives are: 
(i) ensuring that variables are consistently defined in the two datasets, (ii) 
identifying the reference population, and (iii) obtaining adjustment factors to 
correct reported incomes for under-reporting with a view to evading tax. 
With respect to defining variables consistently, in tax returns incomes are 
obviously reported gross of income tax. Moreover, self-employment and 
farming incomes are gross of social contributions, while wages, salaries and 
pensions are net of social contributions. As regards the household budget 
survey, all income is reported net of social contributions and income tax. To 
ensure comparability, we used a tax-benefit model to compute income taxes 
(and, in the case of the self-employed, social contributions as well), then added 
these to net incomes in order to have gross incomes in both datasets. 
On a minor point, self-employment income (originally defined in the data as 
income from a liberal profession or from business not in agriculture) was made 
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to include property income (i.e. income from rents) and maintenance income in 
both datasets for the sake of consistency. 
With respect to defining the reference population, we re-weighted the sample 
of tax returns to be representative of the entire population of individuals filing a 
tax return, then we reconciled the re-weighted sample of tax returns with the 
survey sample to ensure that it is similar in both datasets. More specifically, we 
re-weighted the tax returns sample to reflect the distribution of population and 
the distribution of average household (tax unit) income. Subsequently, we 
reconciled the re-weighted sample of tax returns experimenting with two 
alternative reference populations: those liable to file a tax return (excluding 
non-zero incomes), and those liable to pay non-zero tax. 
In the first scenario we identified tax filers according to tax legislation 
mandating that only (i) wage/salary earners with annual income below €6,000 
and (ii) farmers and others earning less than €3,000 a year are exempt from the 
obligation to submit a tax return (except if they are self-employed, own a car or 
boat, or have gross annual property income over €600). We estimate the 
coverage of the income tax system in 2004 at 93.4% of the population. Note 
that as the necessary information to identify tax filers is not always available, 
the relevant population cannot be perfectly simulated. In the second scenario 
we applied the zero-tax threshold of €8,400 or €10,000 a year as a cut-off point 
to identify those liable to pay non-zero tax. 
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The number of tax filers identified in the survey was 9,736, of which 9,622 
reported non-zero incomes (4,964 incomes above the zero-tax threshold). By 
definition, the sample of tax returns comprises tax filers only, of which 34,213 
reported positive incomes (14,444 reported incomes above the zero-tax 
threshold). 
Faced with a choice between the two alternative reference populations, those 
with non-zero income and those with non-zero tax, we opted for the second 
option. The rationale was that the obligation to file a tax return could not be 
perfectly simulated, as a result of which the population of tax filers in the 
survey was too dissimilar to that in the sample of tax returns. In fact, compared 
to the household budget survey, the proportion of tax filers below the zero-tax 
threshold in the sample of tax returns was significantly higher (58% vs. 48%), 
and their average income significantly lower (€10,993 vs. €15,158). We think 
that focusing on tax filers above the zero-tax threshold tax limits the scope for 
errors in the measurement of income at the bottom of the distribution. 
With respect to obtaining adjustment factors (needed to correct incomes for tax 
evasion), we allocated the reference population of tax filers above the zero-tax 
threshold into 16 categories defined as combinations of region and source of 
income. Our decision not to pursue a finer categorisation rested mainly on 
considerations of sample size: since 8 of our 16 categories contained less than 
200 observations, splitting them further into, say, another 4 each was bound to 
produce too many categories with too few observations. 
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Specifically, the four regions were Greater Athens, Northern (Thrace, 
Macedonia and Thessaly), Southern (Central, Western and Peloponnese), and 
the Islands (Aegean, Ionian and Crete); the four sources of income were wages 
and salaries, pensions, farming and self employment. 
Adjustment factors are ratios of reported to survey income. Let 
R
ijy
 denote the 
average income from source j of individuals resident in region i as reported to 
tax authorities and 
T
ijy
 the corresponding average income as observed in the 
survey. Further, let 
R
jy
 denote the average reported income and 
T
jy
 the average 
survey income from source j irrespective of region. Each adjustment factor ijα  






where i = A (Athens), N (Northern), S (Southern), I (Islands);  
and j = w (wages, salaries), p (pensions), f (farm income), s (self-
employment income). 
Even though we originally found the ratio of reported to survey incomes to be 
102.2 (implying over-reporting by 2.2%), we set adjustment factors for pension 
incomes equal to one (i.e. i1,α ip ∀= ). Since tax returns are cross-checked 
against the records of benefit-paying agencies, and since taxpayers use these 
agencies’ statements to fill in their tax return, it is impossible to under-report 
(or, for that matter, over-report) one’s pension incomes in tax returns – except 
due to measurement (e.g. recall) error. 
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We also observed small rates of over-reporting for wages and salaries in 
Athens and in the Islands (4.1% and 4.7% respectively). Again, the 
corresponding adjustment factors were set equal to one (i.e. 1αα IwAw == ), on 
the grounds that no-one knowingly reports higher incomes in a tax return than 




ij ∀≥ ). 
Finally, since the relevant category was critically small in the survey (n=8) , we 
set the adjustment factor for income from farming in Athens equal to 1 minus 
the “national” rate of under-reporting (53.2%) for that type of income (i.e. 
0.468yyα TfRfAf == ). 
The resulting adjustment factors by income source and region are shown in 
Table 2. 
Table 2. Adjustment factors. 
 Athens Northern Southern Islands 
wages / salaries 1.000 0.978 0.992 1.000 
pensions 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
farming 0.468 0.412 0.530 0.519 
self employment 0.770 0.860 0.640 0.712 
Notes: The adjustment factors are multiplied by survey incomes in order to derive a distribution of tax 
reported incomes. 
In order to draw out the implications of income under-reporting for the 
resulting distribution of post-tax disposable incomes and in terms of tax 
evaded, we use the Greek component of the European tax-benefit model 
EUROMOD (see: http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/msu/emod/). 
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4. Results 
Our results are summarized in Tables 3-6. Table 3 shows rates of under-
reporting alongside three dimensions: income source, region and family size.  
Table 3. Under-reporting by income source, region and family type. 
 
population 
share survey income 
tax reported 
income difference 
wages / salaries 41.5% 13,085 13,007 -0.6% 
pensions 37.1% 7,960 7,960 0.0% 
farming 6.3% 12,353 5,819 -52.9% 
self employment 15.1% 19,327 14,616 -24.4% 
Greater Athens 39.2% 14,555 13,733 -5.6% 
Northern 27.4% 11,152 9,859 -11.6% 
Southern 22.7% 10,839 9,110 -16.0% 
Islands 10.8% 11,534 9,991 -13.4% 
single 35.5% 9,970 9,252 -7.2% 
women 20.4% 8,753 8,414 -3.9% 
men 15.1% 11,611 10,383 -10.6% 
married no children 34.5% 11,310 10,136 -10.4% 
married 1 child 12.5% 16,250 14,446 -11.1% 
married 2 children 13.7% 17,034 15,133 -11.2% 
married 3 children 3.1% 17,042 14,818 -13.1% 
married 4+ children 0.6% 17,225 14,348 -16.7% 
Notes: Mean income by category is non-equivalised annual personal income in euros. Population 
shares refer to positive (non-zero) income earners only. Survey income is observed in HBS 2004/05. 
Tax reported income is adjusted for under-reporting using the adjustment factors by region and income 
source shown in Table 2. Income from self employment includes property. 
Predictably, in terms of income source, farming or self-employment incomes 
are more likely to be under-reported in tax returns: average under-reporting 
rates for these two sources are 53% and 24% respectively, while reported 
incomes from wages and salaries or pensions are nearly identical to survey 
incomes. In terms of region, under-reporting appears to be most pronounced in 
Southern Greece (16%) and least so in Greater Athens (less than 6%). Also, 
income under-reporting seems to increase with family size: singles under-report 
least, while married people with four children under-report most. Also, in the 
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singles category, we found that men under-report significantly more than 
women (10.6% vs. 3.9%). 
Table 4 shows how under-reporting varies by income group. The extent of 
income under-reporting seems to be greatest at the two ends of the income 
distribution, especially in the highest income decile (about 15%), followed by 
the bottom three deciles (10-11%). The average rate of under-reporting for the 
entire population is almost 10%. 
Table 4. Under-reporting by level of income. 
 survey income tax reported income Difference 
decile 1 (poorest) 1,963 1,769 -9.9% 
decile 2 3,540 3,174 -10.4% 
decile 3 5,667 5,031 -11.2% 
decile 4 7,079 6,715 -5.1% 
decile 5 8,191 7,723 -5.7% 
decile 6 9,867 9,172 -7.0% 
decile 7 12,298 11,322 -7.9% 
decile 8 15,447 14,314 -7.3% 
decile 9 19,869 18,525 -6.8% 
decile 10 (richest) 39,650 33,839 -14.7% 
top 1% 96,526 73,732 -23.6% 
top 0.1% 156,859 126,523 -19.3% 
Total 12,455 11,220 -9.9% 
Notes: Mean income by income group is non-equivalised annual personal income in euros. Income 
deciles constructed excluding those earning zero or negative incomes. Survey income is observed in 
HBS 2004/05. Tax reported income is adjusted for under-reporting using the adjustment factors by 
region and income source shown in Table 2. 
Table 5 presents our estimate of taxable income and the resulting tax liability 
under the competing assumptions of full compliance and tax evasion 
respectively. The findings worth highlighting are that under-reporting lowers 
taxable income by slightly more than reported income; that tax allowances and 
reductions are broadly similar in the two datasets; that tax evasion raises 
average disposable income by 2.7%; and that it reduces the tax yield by 26.1%. 
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The latter figure can be decomposed to 11.1% fewer persons paying on average 
16.7% less tax.  
Table 5: Income tax variables under full compliance and tax evasion. 
 full compliance tax evasion difference 
reported income 12,455 11,220 -9.9% 
taxable income 11,957 10,724 -10.3% 
tax allowances 499 499 0.0% 
tax reductions 182 181 -0.6% 
tax due (all) 1,175 868 -26.1% 
tax due (non-zero) 3,263 2,716 -16.7% 
disposable income 11,280 11,587 2.7% 
Notes: Mean income is non-equivalised annual personal income in euros. Full compliance provides 
estimates of income tax variables assuming incomes are reported to tax authorities as observed in the 
survey. Tax evasion provides estimates of the same variables assuming incomes are under-reported to 
tax authorities as implied by the adjustment factors shown in Table 2. The share of positive non-zero 
income earners paying non-zero tax is 36.0% and 32.0% under full compliance and tax evasion 
respectively. 
Table 6 presents the fiscal and distributional implications of tax evasion in 
terms of poverty and inequality, tax progressivity, and tax receipts. Since 
household disposable income is higher under tax evasion than would have been 
under full compliance, the relative poverty line is also higher (by 1%). 
Nonetheless, our two poverty indices rise, suggesting that tax evasion causes 
relative poverty to rise. All five inequality indicators (S80/S20, Gini, Atkinson 
for e=0.5 and e=2, and Theil) have higher values for tax reported than for 
survey income, implying that tax evasion results in a more unequal income 
distribution. Finally, the tax progressivity and redistribution indices (Kakwani, 
Reynolds-Smolensky, Suits) indicate that income under-reporting renders the 
tax system more regressive. 
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Table 6: Fiscal and distributional implications of tax evasion.  
 full compliance tax evasion difference 
tax receipts (€ million) 7,890 5,830 -26.1% 
poverty line (€ p.a.) 5,578 5,636 1.0% 
poverty rate (FGT α=0) 18.9 19.3 2.3% 
poverty gap (FGT α=1) 6.0 6.1 1.6% 
Gini 0.320 0.331 3.5% 
S80/S20 5.424 5.705 5.2% 
Atkinson e=0.5 0.088 0.094 7.2% 
Atkinson e=2 0.422 0.434 2.7% 
Theil 0.177 0.194 9.2% 
Kakwani 0.116 0.104 -10.0% 
Reynolds-Smolensky 0.028 0.022 -23.5% 
Suits 0.207 0.173 -16.2% 
Notes: Full compliance provides estimates of income tax variables assuming incomes are reported to 
tax authorities as observed in the survey. Tax evasion provides estimates of the same variables 
assuming incomes are under-reported to tax authorities as implied by the adjustment factors shown in 
Table 2. Fiscal effects (i.e. tax receipts) are in terms of non-equivalised euros. Distributional indices are 
computed on the basis of equivalised household disposable incomes. The poverty line is set at 60% of 
median equivalised household disposable income, and is calculated separately under full compliance 
and tax evasion. FGT is the Foster Greer Thorbecke family of poverty indices. 
 
5. Discussion 
As shown above, the estimated aggregate rate of income under-reporting for 
the purpose of tax evasion is around 10%. With respect to income source, 
under-reporting is close to zero with respect to earnings from dependent 
employment and pensions, but reaches 53% and 24% with respect to income 
from farming and from self-employment respectively. This is strictly consistent 
with the literature, as well as with prior notions as to the different opportunities 
for tax evasion presented to different occupations. 
Nevertheless, it seems unlikely that under-reporting of wages and salaries in 
Greece is nearly zero. The standard assumption that it must be negligible 
because of withholding and information provided by employers cannot hold in 
the case of collusion – i.e. when employers and employees agree to conceal all 
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or part of wages paid in order to reduce both employers’ labour costs and 
workers’ take-home pay. 
In fact, empirical evidence suggests the existence of a large shadow economy 
centred on precarious, unregistered, informal jobs (petits boulots). The 
Inspectorate Service of the Social Insurance Foundation IKA estimated that 
employers in 10% of all firms inspected in 2008 failed to pay social 
contributions, while 27% of all workers remained unregistered (press release, 
25 January 2009). Such practices are particularly widespread in retail trade, 
construction, tourism, contracted-out services such as cleaning and catering and 
so on. 
We think there are three reasons we failed to detect much under-reporting of 
wages and salaries earned by the informally employed. To start with, a large 
proportion of those concerned belong to disadvantaged groups such as foreign 
workers, who tend to be under-represented in household budget surveys. On the 
other hand, tax records are truncated, either in the sense that unregistered 
workers are by definition invisible to tax authorities, or because those earning 
below a certain level (€3,000 a year) are legally exempt from the obligation to 
fill in a tax return. Thirdly, given that the household budget survey and our 
sample of tax returns were drawn from different populations, as a consequence 
of which a fair amount of re-weighting had to be done, it is possible that some 
variation was smoothed out in the process. 
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With respect to region, the extent of income under-reporting by region appears 
to be smaller in Greater Athens than in the North, in the Islands and, especially, 
the South. This may be attributed to the concentration of public employment 
and government-sponsored economic activity in and around Athens, and to the 
significance of farming, tourism and the construction sector in other regional 
economies. 
As explained before, all other results are due to composition effect, driven by 
our estimates of under-reporting and resulting adjustment rates by income 
source and region. This is clearly true for the pattern of non-compliance by 
household type: under-reporting seems to be lowest for single persons, and to 
rise with family size. This seems consistent with most of the empirical 
literature (Clotfelter, 1983; Feinstein, 1991), but in our case is simply the effect 
of the higher incidence of farming and self-employment in larger families. 
Similarly derived is our result by income class, which suggests something 
between a U- and a J-shape. It appears that income under-reporting for the 
purpose of tax evasion is higher in low-income groups than middle-to-high 
income groups, and even higher in top incomes. Specifically, the rate of income 
under-reporting is 10-11% in the bottom 3 deciles, falls to 5-6% in deciles 4 
and 5, rises slightly to 7-8% in deciles 6 to 9, and then sharply to almost 15% in 
the top decile (24% in the top centile). 
Since, by design, under-reporting was not allowed to vary by income class, this 
U- or J-pattern is entirely due to the concentration of pensioners and wage or 
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salary earners in the middle of the distribution, combined with the high 
incidence of small shopkeepers and farmers at low incomes, and the strong 
presence of self-employed professionals at the top. 
As discussed earlier, the available evidence on the relation between tax evasion 
and income class is mixed. In particular, beyond the literature reviewed in the 
relevant section, our finding that tax evasion is more prevalent at high incomes 
finds some extra support in the results of the 1999 values survey jointly 
conducted by WVS and EVS – at least insofar as survey-based attitudes 
towards tax evasion reflect actual behaviour. In that survey, the share of 
respondents agreeing with the statement “cheating on tax if you have the 
chance is never justified” was greater at low- than at high-income levels in 
Greece (43% vs. 30%). Incidentally, the same was true in several other 
countries including Germany, Italy, Hungary and the US, although variation by 
income class was not significant in Britain. The survey also shows that 
variation in attitudes towards tax evasion across countries is wide indeed 
(http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org). 
Clearly, the implications of a given rate of under-reporting at low levels of 
income are very different from those of the same rate further up the income 
distribution – and not just because of the difference between relative and 
absolute terms. At the bottom, because of significant tax-free allowances, 
especially for families with children, the fiscal effect of income under-reporting 
is pretty minimal. At the top, because of progressive taxation, extensive non-
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compliance (as practised, for example, by the medical profession and other 
groups) translates into sizeable losses in terms of tax receipts, and has 
considerable effects in terms of income inequality and the progressivity of the 
tax system in the real world. 
Using a tax-benefit model enabled us to compute the distributional and fiscal 
effects of tax evasion, by simulating tax due under full compliance and under 
tax evasion, and by comparing the outputs. This produced a series of interesting 
results. To start with, we found that 10% income under-reporting results in 
26% shortfall in tax receipts, which is obviously a function of the progressive 
structure of income taxation in Greece. 
Distributional effects may be seen as rather predictable, given the pattern of 
under-reporting by level of income discussed above. However, this is less true 
than it may appear. The results shown in Table 6 were computed on the basis of 
the distribution of equivalised household disposable income, while the results 
shown in Table 4 relied on the distribution of non-equivalised personal pre-tax 
incomes instead. 
In spite of this important difference, we find that tax evasion is associated with 
more inequality, by between 2.7% (Atkinson e=2) and 9.2% (Theil). What this 
seems to suggest is that the effect of tax evasion on inequality is highest for 
indices that are more sensitive to changes at high levels of income, which is not 
unexpected, given the distribution of income under-reporting and the operation 
of a progressive income tax schedule. Rather less obviously, tax evasion also 
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seems to cause the poverty rate and the poverty gap to rise above what would 
have been under full tax compliance, in spite of the fact that the poverty line 
was allowed to rise to reflect higher disposable incomes with tax evasion. 
Finally, the effect of tax evasion on tax progressivity appears to be substantial: 
the decline in the Kakwani index was estimated at 10%; that of the Suits index 
at 16.2%; furthermore, the reduction in the Reynolds-Smolensky index was 
estimated at 23.5%. All three suggest that tax evasion renders the tax system 
more regressive. 
Overall, our analysis seems to underestimate the magnitude of income tax 
receipts under tax evasion (€5.83 billion) compared with official figures (€6.66 
billion). We assume this is because we have been unable to simulate the Greek 
tax system in its full complexity. For instance, as explained earlier, 
presumptive taxation and the presence of luxury assets may lead tax auditors to 
revise taxable income upwards. Both sets of rules defy simulation. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Tax evasion in Greece was shown to increase inequality and poverty, and to 
reduce tax progressivity, as well as implying a considerable loss of tax receipts. 
This is a strong finding – but is it to be trusted? 
A cause for caution regards the distinction between static and dynamic effects 
of tax evasion. It is important to remember that taxation (and, by implication, 
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tax evasion) does not simply reduce disposable incomes; it also affects 
decisions concerning supply of, and demand, for labour, the allocation of 
disposable income between consumption and savings, the allocation of 
consumption between different goods and services and so on (Slemrod and 
Yitzhaki 2002, Sandmo 2005). Although the analysis of such dynamic effects 
lies well beyond the scope of this paper, we need to recognise that the 
implications of tax evasion exceed what we can show with a static arithmetical 
recalculation of the income distribution. 
On a related point, while our approach focuses on the effects of income tax 
evasion, the distributional impact of evading other taxes (e.g. company tax, 
capital tax, value added tax) is likely to reinforce these effects. The case of 
social contributions, often evaded at the same time as income taxes, deserves a 
comment. Two effects operate here. On the one hand, social contributions are 
paid at a flat rate in the case of employer and employee contributions, or as a 
lump sum in the case of self-employed contributions, and they are payable from 
the first €1 earned (i.e. no lower earnings threshold typically applies). As a 
result of that, the distributional impact of evasion may be less regressive for 
social contributions than it is for income tax. On the other hand, employer 
social contributions in Greece are formally twice as high as employee 
contributions, as a result of which (and given labour market realities) 
unregistered work and incomplete reporting of wages may reduce employers’ 
labour costs far more than it may raise take-home workers’ incomes. Recall 
also that, as recognised by Slemrod (2007), the presence of tax evasion calls 
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into question the standard result that the incidence of taxes does not in the long 
run depend on which side of the labour market payroll taxes are levied. On 
balance, taking both effects into account, we think that evasion of social 
contributions is more likely to reinforce than mitigate the regressive impact of 
tax evasion. 
Our approach relies on matching data from tax returns with survey data. While 
we have made an effort to make the two sources comparable, our adjustment 
techniques offer at best good approximations. In particular, the truncated nature 
of tax records (i.e. low-income families pay no taxes) and the limited reliability 
of income statistics at either end of the income scale leave our estimates 
vulnerable to measurement error. Therefore, our results should be seen as 
tentative estimates under an experimental research design. Clearly, the design 
itself can be improved further, e.g. by trying other approaches to matching the 
two databases, by repeating the analysis with a larger sample of tax returns, or 
by collecting more information, enabling us to create smaller, more 
homogeneous categories. 
A possible refinement concerns the introduction of stochastic variation. 
Specifically, there is no reason to think that all members of a given category 
under-report their incomes by the same ratio: some will report less, some more, 
some others may even faithfully reveal their incomes to the tax authorities. This 
would be consistent with the literature: a TCMP study found that among 
taxpayers with reported income between $50,000 and $100,000 in 1988, 60% 
  30 
understated tax, 14% overstated it, and 26% reported tax correctly (Christian, 
1994). Stochastic variation involves introducing a random term around an 
average rate of under-reporting by category. Again, this exceeds the scope of 
the current paper. 
Our key assumption is to treat incomes observed in the household budget 
survey as closer approximations of “true income”, on the grounds that people 
have no incentive to conceal their income from survey interviewers, since their 
disposable income would not be affected by their response. The intuition – 
reflected in similar approaches taken in other studies (Fiorio and D’Amuri, 
2005) – is reasonable, but not necessarily correct. The role of measurement 
error, introducing indeterminacy and calling for a healthy dose of scepticism, 
was discussed above. Quite apart from that, there are at least two reasons to 
suspect that the actual but unknown level of tax evasion may be considerably 
higher than that implied by our estimates. 
On the one hand, while our approach attempts to capture income under-
reporting, in the sense of individuals reporting a lower figure in their tax return, 
some tax evasion is also caused by individuals who decline to file a tax return 
altogether. On the other hand, there is evidence (Elffers et al., 1987) that the 
very same factors causing tax evasion (low trust, low tax morale and so on), 
combined with the wish of tax-evading individuals to be somehow 
“consistent”, may cause under-reporting of incomes in surveys as well, albeit at 
a lower level. To the extent that these factors are at work here, our estimates of 
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tax evasion will be biased downwards. That would be consistent with the 
reflection of Schneider and Enste (2000), that “it is unlikely that [direct 
methods] capture all shadow activities, so they can be seen as lower-bound 
estimates”. 
A final word concerns the nature of our research. Even though the design of our 
work was experimental, the assumptions we have had to rely upon were 
sometimes crude, and several issues (some of which discussed here) remain 
unresolved, we believe our results capture essential aspects of the problem we 
set out to explore. Our core finding, that tax evasion in Greece has a regressive 
impact, seems reasonably robust. While we have not addressed the question of 
the optimal design of tax auditing policies, our results suggest that the payoff of 
efforts to reduce tax evasion could be very substantial indeed: higher tax 
receipts, lower poverty, reduced inequality, and a more progressive tax system. 
After all, it may be that the “egalitarian policy maker” invoked by Cowell 
(1987) has little reason to “smile indulgently on evasion”, and every reason 
actively to engage in a sustained effort to reduce it.  
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